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INTRODUCTION 
The grant of subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts based on diver-
sity of citizenship has, for centuries, required complete diversity between 
parties to the litigation.1 If a case is brought in state court and complete 
diversity exists between the parties, the defendant has the statutory right to 
remove the case to federal court.2 Absent another basis for federal jurisdiction, 
the lack of complete diversity strips the federal court of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and the court is required to remand the case to state court.3 
Therefore, the presence of a single nondiverse defendant is sufficient to 
defeat diversity jurisdiction.  
The doctrine of fraudulent joinder has arisen in response to plaintiffs’ 
efforts to take advantage of this complete diversity requirement and thereby 
control whether a state or federal court hears their case. Fraudulent joinder 
refers to a plaintiff ’s attempt to defeat complete diversity and generally 
occurs in one of two ways: (1) a plaintiff commits actual fraud by inaccurately 
pleading the citizenship of the parties to the lawsuit or (2) a plaintiff sues a 
nondiverse defendant against whom the plaintiff cannot establish a cause of 
 
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (granting original jurisdiction to district courts over cases be-
tween citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000); Strawbridge v. 
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (imposing the complete diversity requirement).  
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the 
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the 
defendant . . . .”).  
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012) (mandating remand if the federal court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction at any point in the litigation).  
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action.4 This Comment focuses only on the second method, which is 
litigated with much greater frequency than the first.5 In this context, the 
diverse defendant will generally remove the case to federal court and argue 
that the judge should ignore the citizenship of the nondiverse co-defendant 
because the plaintiff has no chance of stating a claim against that defendant.6  
If the federal court determines that the plaintiff has no cause of action 
against the nondiverse defendant, the court is permitted to ignore that 
defendant’s citizenship and thereby establish complete diversity.7 However, 
if the court determines that the nondiverse defendant is properly joined, 
then complete diversity is absent and the case must be remanded to state 
court. The result of a fraudulent joinder dispute therefore determines 
whether a suit will be heard in state or federal court—an important consid-
eration for litigants.8 
To resolve the fraudulent joinder question, the federal judge must look 
to a source of law to determine whether the plaintiff has established a cause 
of action against the nondiverse defendant. In many cases, all parties agree 
on which law applies to the case; in those circumstances, the judge will 
conduct the fraudulent joinder inquiry using the agreed-upon legal standards. 
In some cases, however, the events giving rise to the litigation have connec-
tions to multiple jurisdictions and therefore multiple laws could potentially 
apply. In these cases, the judge must decide which state’s law to use to 
determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim against the nondiverse 
defendant. 
In such a case, it is not clear how a judge should approach this choice of 
law determination or whether the judge is even permitted to make a choice 
of law determination at all. On the one hand, if the nondiverse defendant is 
properly joined, the federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction 
and arguably cannot make a choice of law determination. On the other 
hand, there may be cases in which the plaintiff can state a claim against the 
nondiverse defendant under one state’s substantive standard, but not under 
 
4 Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003).  
5 James M. Underwood, From Proxy to Principle: Fraudulent Joinder Reconsidered, 69 ALB. L. 
REV. 1013, 1019-20 (2006). Note that the term “fraudulent joinder” is also sometimes used to refer 
to an inappropriately joined co-plaintiff or to the joinder of a claim that is procedurally flawed, 
rather than flawed on the merits. Id. at 1020 n.32. These variations are beyond the scope of this 
Comment.  
6 Id. at 1019-20.  
7 Matthew C. Monahan, Note, De-Frauding the System: Sham Plaintiffs and the Fraudulent 
Joinder Doctrine, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1349 (2012). 
8 See Underwood, supra note 5, at 1013-14 (noting that whether a case is tried before a state or 
federal judge has a significant impact on the results of the adjudication of claims).  
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another state’s standard. In these cases, the court cannot resolve the fraudu-
lent joinder dispute without making a choice of law determination.  
This Comment takes the position that a court must perform a choice of 
law analysis as part of its fraudulent joinder inquiry. This determination is 
necessary to decide whether a law could apply to the case that would sustain 
the action against the nondiverse defendant. Further, the court should give 
the same deference to the plaintiff ’s choice of law as it gives to the plaintiff ’s 
choice of forum under the jurisdiction’s fraudulent joinder standard. This 
conclusion draws upon the idea that choice of law is fundamentally a merits-
based inquiry and that a decision on the merits requires reference to an 
applicable law. Therefore, a court cannot properly make a determination 
about whether the suit against the nondiverse defendant has merit, or is 
merely “fraudulent,” without selecting and applying an appropriate law.  
Part I of this Comment discusses the legal standards and principles 
behind diversity jurisdiction, fraudulent joinder, and choice of law. Part II 
discusses the inconsistent approaches that courts have taken to choice of law 
in the fraudulent joinder context. Finally, Part III argues that a choice of 
law determination is necessary in a fraudulent joinder case because a federal 
court cannot determine whether a plaintiff has a colorable claim against the 
nondiverse defendant without reference to a colorable law. This Comment 
contends that the choice of law determination should be made with reference 
to the particular jurisdiction’s fraudulent joinder standard.  
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO CHOICE OF LAW IN 
FRAUDULENT JOINDER LITIGATION 
This Part reviews the key legal standards that are relevant to choice of 
law issues in fraudulent joinder litigation. Section A discusses the legal 
authority for diversity jurisdiction and the justifications for federal courts to 
hear diversity cases. Section B discusses the different standards courts use 
to decide whether a party has been “fraudulently joined” to the litigation. 
Section C reviews the most common choice of law approaches that courts 
use to determine which state’s law applies to a case.  
A. Diversity Jurisdiction and Its Justifications 
The concept of jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship appears in 
the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to 
all Cases, in Law and Equity . . . between Citizens of different States.”9 The 
 
9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
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power of federal district courts to hear diversity cases is statutory. Section 
1332 of the U.S. Code provides that district courts “shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the 
sum or value of $75,000” and where the lawsuit is between “citizens of 
different States.”10 The diversity requirement of section 1332 has long been 
understood to require complete diversity of citizenship,11 meaning that each 
plaintiff must be diverse from each defendant. By contrast, the Constitution 
requires only minimal diversity,12 which provides for federal jurisdiction as 
long as any one plaintiff is diverse from any one defendant.  
The original justification for diversity jurisdiction is a matter of some 
debate. Many commentators argued that diversity jurisdiction was necessary 
to provide “a forum where parochial state laws would not be enforced”; 
instead, the federal courts would apply a “general federal law” to those 
cases.13 But as Professor Percy points out, this rationale cannot support the 
existence of diversity jurisdiction today in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.14 At the time of the Constitutional 
Convention, only a small number of delegates suggested that diversity 
jurisdiction was designed to protect out-of-state citizens from local prejudice.15 
 
10 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012).  
11 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (“If there be two or more 
joint plaintiffs, and two or more joint defendants, each of the plaintiffs must be capable of suing 
each of the defendants, in the courts of the United States, in order to support the jurisdiction.”).  
12 See C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 633 (2004) 
(“Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on 
diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.” (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Since the requirement 
of complete diversity is not a constitutional requirement, Congress has the power to authorize 
suits based on minimal diversity. See Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The 
Improper Party Problem in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 785 (2006) (noting that 
Congress approved class actions in federal court based on minimal diversity in 2005).  
13 E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court Based on 
Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 197 (2005).  
14 Id. at 198; see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters 
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is 
the law of the State. . . . There is no federal general common law.”).  
15 See Percy, supra note 13, at 198. Although Professor Percy doubts the actual significance that 
the concept of prejudice had in early debates around diversity jurisdiction, he notes that many 
courts cite to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 
Cranch) 61 (1809), as support for the proposition that diversity jurisdiction was intended to 
combat prejudice against out-of-state parties. Percy, supra note 13, at 199; see, e.g., O’Brien v. 
AVCO Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1033 (2d Cir. 1969) (explaining that the danger of prejudice was the 
“historical rationale” for diversity jurisdiction and remains its “chief underlying support” (citing 
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87)).  
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Today, although there is some dispute over whether such prejudice exists,16 
the fear of local prejudice is a commonly cited justification for the existence 
of diversity jurisdiction.17 
Diversity jurisdiction is undoubtedly a powerful tool that has a very real 
effect on litigation. If diversity exists, a defendant may remove a case 
initially filed in state court to federal court.18 On the other hand, if the 
plaintiff can show at any point during the litigation that complete diversity 
does not exist, then the district court must remand the case to state court.19  
Whether a suit will be heard in federal or state court is often extremely 
important to litigants. In many cases, ensuring that the most desirable 
forum hears the case is “the most important strategic decision a party makes 
in a lawsuit.”20 Because state courts are generally considered more favorable 
toward plaintiffs, many plaintiffs file in state court and fight removal to 
federal court; by contrast, defendants have a strong incentive to remove the 
case.21 This practice indicates that the concerns about bias toward in-state 
parties are likely justified.22 In fact, studies have shown that the result of the 
dispute over removal to federal court has a strong predictive effect on the 
 
16 See Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 54 n.26 (2009) (collecting authorities that have argued 
both for and against the idea that local bias is no longer sufficient to sustain diversity jurisdiction).  
17 See, e.g., Díaz-Rodríguez v. Pep Boys Corp., 410 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2005) (“A primary 
purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to shield foreign parties from the prejudice they might face as 
outsiders in state court.”); Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1152 n.3 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“The original central justification for diversity jurisdiction was grounded in the fear of prejudice 
against outsiders from other states, or in other words, the lack of confidence in the adequacy of 
state court justice.”). 
18 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the dis-
trict courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or 
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing 
the place where such action is pending.”).  
19 Id. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).  
20 Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 55-58 (explaining that forum selection can have an impact on 
geographic location, the substantive and procedural laws applied in the case, and the value of a 
case at settlement).  
21 See Percy, supra note 13, at 205-06 & n.110 (explaining that generally plaintiffs prefer to 
litigate in state court and defendants prefer to litigate in federal court for a variety of reasons, 
including differences in procedural rules and the general perception among litigants that state 
court judges are more favorable to plaintiffs and federal judges are more favorable to defendants); 
see also Heather R. Barber, Removal and Remand, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (2004) (noting 
that federal courts are believed to be more defendant-friendly).  
22 See Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 57 (“In reality, a case does not receive the same treatment 
or have the same chance of success in federal court as it does in state court, especially when local 
plaintiffs sue large, out-of-state corporations.” (footnote omitted)).  
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outcome of the litigation.23 Putting concerns of bias aside, the federal forum 
provides a number of procedural advantages for defendants, “includ[ing] the 
increased availability of summary judgment, the possibility of separating the 
trial into liability and damages phases, the increased role of the federal 
judge in the scheduling process, and federal evidentiary laws that may be 
more favorable to defendants.”24 Given these distinctions between state and 
federal courts, the ultimate forum for a case remains critically important to 
both parties to the litigation.25 
B. Development of Fraudulent Joinder Law 
Fraudulent joinder is a direct response to the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of litigating in state or federal court. A plaintiff ’s incentive to 
“fraudulently join” a nondiverse defendant is fairly clear—the nondiverse 
defendant destroys complete diversity and allows the plaintiff to litigate in 
the more favorable state court forum. The development of fraudulent 
joinder doctrine was a response to this sort of jurisdictional gamesmanship 
by plaintiffs. The doctrine “permits federal courts to essentially ignore the 
inclusion in a lawsuit of a nondiverse party who would otherwise destroy 
federal diversity jurisdiction when the district court concludes that the 
party’s joinder is a sham.”26 Although this doctrine is necessary to prevent 
diverse defendants from being wrongfully denied their statutory right to 
remove to federal court, its exact contours remain largely undefined. The 
fraudulent joinder doctrine was originally elaborated in a series of Supreme 
Court opinions but has not been addressed by the Court in many years. As a 
result, lower federal courts have developed a number of competing standards 
to determine whether a nondiverse defendant has been fraudulently joined. 
This Section traces the development of the fraudulent joinder doctrine 
through Supreme Court precedent and into the modern day.  
 
23 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything 
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998) 
(“[I]n diversity cases, the win rate drops from 71% in original cases to 34% in removed cases.”). 
Although the difference between a state and federal forum is undoubtedly impactful, Clermont 
and Eisenberg’s study likely overstates the effect. As the authors recognize, the strength of the 
cases that are removed and the quality of the lawyering in those cases may also contribute to the 
low win rates. Id. at 603-05. However, even accounting for these factors, the authors found that 
removal had a significant effect on outcome. Id.  
24 Monahan, supra note 7, at 1342 n.6 (citations omitted).  
25 See Percy, supra note 13, at 191-92 (noting that defendants have become “increasingly 
resistant” to litigating in state court and that the business lobby has succeeded in getting many of 
the largest cases, such as class actions, pushed to federal court).  
26 Underwood, supra note 5, at 1018.  
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1. The Supreme Court’s Elaboration of Fraudulent Joinder 
The Supreme Court has referenced the fraudulent joinder doctrine on 
multiple occasions but has made only limited holdings as to the contours of 
the doctrine. Most modern development of fraudulent joinder jurispru-
dence has occurred in the lower courts. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
cases provide an important framework for understanding fraudulent joinder 
and for evaluating the legal standards used in the lower courts today.  
The Supreme Court has traditionally been resistant to defendants’ 
attempts to alter the structure of the lawsuit as pleaded by the plaintiff. 
Generally, “[a] plaintiff is master of her complaint and thus is permitted to 
preclude removal in some circumstances.”27 In an early case, the Court 
noted that “[a] defendant has no right to say that an action shall be several 
which the plaintiff seeks to make joint. . . . [I]t cannot deprive a plaintiff of 
his right to prosecute his suit to final decision in his own way.”28 The Court 
explained that the question of removability must be decided based on the 
plaintiff ’s pleadings at the time of removal and that a defendant’s showing 
that liability is several could not alter the case pleaded by the plaintiff.29 The 
Court would later explain that “the fact that the defendants might have 
been sued separately affords no ground for removal,” again giving deference 
to the plaintiff ’s decision to pursue defendants jointly.30 
However, the Court has also been conscious of attempts by litigants to 
manipulate jurisdiction. Where the plaintiff “attempt[s] to commit a fraud 
upon the jurisdiction of the Federal courts[,]” the Court has stated that “the 
Federal courts may and should take such action as will defeat attempts to 
wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in the Federal courts of the 
protection of their rights in those tribunals.”31 Although the Court used the 
term “fraud” in this early articulation of the fraudulent joinder doctrine, the 
meaning of “fraud” in this context was largely unclear. Initially, the Court 
seemed to imply that proving fraudulent joinder required a showing of bad 
faith on the part of the plaintiff.32 The subject of the bad faith requirement 
 
27 Monahan, supra note 7, at 1347 (noting that a plaintiff may manipulate the forum that hears 
her lawsuit and intentionally prevent removal in certain circumstances). 
28 Ala. Great S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 214-15 (1906) (quoting Powers v. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 97 (1898)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
29 Id. at 215-16; see also Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939) (holding that the 
court of appeals erred in considering the plaintiff ’s second amended complaint rather than the 
plaintiff ’s complaint at the time of the petition for removal).  
30 Jenkins, 305 U.S. at 538.  
31 Thompson, 200 U.S. at 218.  
32 See id. at 220 (declining to find a fraud on the jurisdiction of the federal courts because the 
defendant had not attacked the good faith of the plaintiff ’s pleadings).  
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came directly before the Court in Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping 
Co., where the plaintiff defended against a fraudulent joinder claim by 
arguing that there was no evidence of bad faith on his part.33 The Court 
held that, even where fraud is directly at issue, knowledge could be imputed 
to the plaintiff where he “willfully closes his eyes to information within his 
reach.”34 The Court found that the nondiverse defendant had been fraudu-
lently joined in the case and offered the following explanation: 
While the plaintiff, in good faith, may proceed in the state courts 
upon a cause of action which he alleges to be joint, it is equally true 
that the Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to 
prevent a removal to a Federal court where one has that right, and 
should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the 
Federal court as to permit the state courts, in proper cases, to retain 
their own jurisdiction.35  
In other words, the Wecker Court acknowledged that fraudulent joinder 
could be found if the plaintiff ’s belief in the propriety of the joinder was so 
unfounded as to be objectively unreasonable. Although the requirements of 
proving fraudulent joinder have seemingly weakened to no longer demand a 
showing of bad faith, the Court has clearly placed the burden of proving 
fraudulent joinder on the removing defendant.36 Therefore, the fraudulent 
joinder inquiry begins with the assumption that the plaintiff ’s joinder of the 
nondiverse defendant is legitimate.37 
The Court has drawn a distinction between a defendant’s claim of 
fraudulent joinder and a claim that the plaintiff ’s entire case is meritless. In 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Cockrell, an estate administrator brought 
suit in state court against a diverse railway company and its nondiverse 
employees after a train struck and killed the decedent.38 The railway argued 
that its employees were not negligent and therefore had been fraudulently 
joined.39 The Court explained that the liability of the railway company 
 
33 204 U.S. 176, 185 (1907).  
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 185-86.  
36 See, e.g., Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939) (remanding the case upon finding 
that the removing defendant did not satisfy this burden). 
37 The burden placed on the removing party is significant and is often described as a “heavy 
burden.” See, e.g., Balberdi v. Lewis, No. 12-00582, 2013 WL 1296286, at *2 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2013) 
(“A defendant asserting fraudulent joinder bears the heavy burden of facing both the strong 
presumption against removal jurisdiction as well as the general presumption against fraudulent 
joinder.”), adopted by 2013 WL 1291780 (D. Haw. Mar. 27, 2013). 
38 232 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1914). 
39 Id. at 150-51.  
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depended on the liability of its two employees; therefore, the railway’s claim 
that its employees were not negligent was no different than saying that the 
plaintiff ’s case was “ill founded as to all the defendants.”40 The Court 
explained that this argument went to the merits of the entire action, not to 
the joinder of the individual defendants; therefore, a finding of fraudulent 
joinder was improper.41 This holding has been interpreted by some courts as 
articulating a “common defense rule”: a defendant cannot prove fraudulent 
joinder of individual defendants by raising a “common defense” intended to 
negate the case against all defendants. The use of a “common defense” may 
indicate that the case as a whole has no merit, but it does not prove that a 
particular defendant was fraudulently joined to the case.42  
2. The Lower Courts and Modern Fraudulent Joinder Standards 
Because the Supreme Court has not fully addressed the doctrine of 
fraudulent joinder for many years, much of its development has taken place 
in the lower courts. The frequency of fraudulent joinder litigation has 
increased significantly since the Supreme Court’s most recent decision in 
Pullman Co. v. Jenkins in 1939.43 The issue of fraudulent joinder is especially 
relevant to modern tort litigation. Suits against diverse drug manufacturers 
are joined with suits against nondiverse pharmacists, suits against diverse 
product manufacturers are joined with suits against nondiverse retailers, and 
suits against diverse insurance companies are joined with suits against 
nondiverse insurance agents.44 The standard applied to the fraudulent 
joinder inquiry in a given jurisdiction is important, as some jurisdictions 
allow a more searching inquiry into the merits of the case than others. As 
Professor Percy points out, fraudulent joinder litigation is uniquely prob-
lematic because, while fraudulent joinder is a jurisdictional issue, it also 
 
40 Id. at 153.  
41 Id. at 153-54.  
42 See, e.g., Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2004) (“When the 
only proffered justification for improper joinder is that there is no reasonable basis for predicting 
recovery against the in-state defendant, and that showing is equally dispositive of all defendants 
rather than to the in-state defendants alone, the requisite showing has not been made.”); In re New 
Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 288, 300 (D. Mass. 2004) 
(“[F]raudulent joinder does not exist when an argument offered to prove the fraudulent joinder of 
non-diverse defendants simultaneously shows that no case exists against the diverse defendant or 
defendants. In those circumstances, no legitimate reason exists to label the non-diverse defendants 
as fraudulently joined.”). 
43 See Percy, supra note 13, at 192 (noting that fraudulent joinder litigation has “increased 
dramatically” and is “becoming a prominent and time-consuming aspect of complex tort 
litigation”).  
44 Id. at 192-93.  
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requires courts to evaluate the merits of the complaint against the non-
diverse defendant.45 “The inescapable tension between protecting diverse 
defendants’ right to remove and ensuring that district courts do not exceed 
their statutory jurisdiction” has created a collection of competing legal 
standards among the lower courts in the fraudulent joinder context.46 
Commentators debate how many fraudulent joinder standards actually exist 
and recognize subtle variations among courts within each “standard.”47 
There appear to be at least three distinct standards. 
a. No Reasonable Basis Standard 
Under the first standard, the removing defendant must show that the 
plaintiff has “no reasonable basis” for her claim against the nondiverse 
defendant. The Eighth Circuit, in Filla v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,48 
provides one interpretation of this standard. The court in Filla explained 
that “a proper review should give paramount consideration to the reasona-
bleness of the basis underlying the state claim. Where applicable state 
precedent precludes the existence of a cause of action against a defendant, 
joinder is fraudulent.”49 On the other hand, “if there is a ‘colorable’ cause of 
action—that is, if the state law might impose liability on the resident 
defendant under the facts alleged—then there is no fraudulent joinder.”50 
b. No Possibility of Recovery Standard 
Under the second standard, the removing defendant must show that the 
plaintiff has absolutely “no possibility of recovery” against the nondiverse 
defendant. Unlike the “no reasonable basis” standard, this standard focuses 
on the likelihood of the plaintiff ’s ability to recover, rather than on the 
plaintiff ’s ability to state a claim. The Fourth Circuit, in Hartley v. CSX 
Transportation, Inc., stated this standard as follows: “To show fraudulent 
joinder, the removing party must demonstrate either ‘outright fraud in the 
 
45 See id. at 193 (stating that “federal courts evaluating allegations of fraudulent joinder must 
walk a fine line between appropriately exercising jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction and 
inappropriately determining the merits of a case which lacks complete diversity”).  
46 Id.  
47 Compare Matthew J. Richardson, Clarifying and Limiting Fraudulent Joinder, 58 FLA. L. 
REV. 119, 146-47 (2006) (noting that there are roughly two camps of standards in fraudulent 
joinder cases, but identifying variations within each camp), with Underwood, supra note 5, at 1022-
23 (arguing that at least three fraudulent joinder standards have evolved and noting that it is often 
difficult to determine which standard a court is applying).  
48 336 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2003). 
49 Id. at 810. 
50 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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plaintiff ’s pleading of jurisdictional facts’ or that ‘there is no possibility that 
the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state 
defendant in state court.’”51 The court went on to explain that “[t]he party 
alleging fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden—it must show that the 
plaintiff cannot establish a claim even after resolving all issues of law and 
fact in the plaintiff ’s favor.”52 This “heavy burden” language is a common 
refrain in fraudulent joinder cases.53 The court in Hartley also noted that the 
fraudulent joinder analysis is “even more favorable to the plaintiff than the 
standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss.”54  
c. No Reasonable Possibility of Recovery Standard 
A third standard requires the defendant to show that the plaintiff has 
“no reasonable possibility of recovery” from the nondiverse defendant. In 
Gray ex rel. Rudd v. Beverly Enterprises-Mississippi, Inc., the Fifth Circuit 
explained that under this standard, the removing defendant must show that 
there is “no reasonable basis for predicting that the plaintiff will recover in 
state court.”55 Although this standard uses terminology similar to the “no 
reasonable basis” standard, they are distinct. Unlike the “no reasonable 
basis” standard, this standard focuses on the possibility of recovery, not on 
the possibility of stating a claim. This standard is also distinct from the “no 
possibility of recovery” standard because it is more generous to the removing 
defendant: rather than having to show that the plaintiff has “absolutely no 
possibility” of recovering against the nondiverse defendant, the removing 
defendant need only show that the possibility is not reasonable.56 The court 
in Gray made clear that this third standard was adopted as an intentional 
shift away from the “no possibility of recovery” standard and that it viewed 
the two standards as distinct.57 Moreover, the court stated that the standard 
 
51 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 
232 (4th Cir. 1993)).  
52 Id. 
53 See, e.g., Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The defendant 
seeking removal bears a heavy burden of proving fraudulent joiner [sic], and all factual and legal 
issues must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.”); Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (“An out-of-state defendant who wants to remove must bear a heavy burden to establish 
fraudulent joinder.”). 
54 187 F.3d at 424.  
55 390 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2004).  
56 Id. 
57 See id. (“Though our earlier fraudulent joinder cases had been uncertain as to whether a 
removing defendant must demonstrate an absence of any possibility of recovery in state 
court, . . . the defendant must demonstrate only that there is no reasonable basis for predicting 
that the plaintiff will recover in state court.”). 
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was meant to be similar to the standard for a motion to dismiss,58 whereas 
the “no possibility of recovery” standard is intended to be more favorable 
than the standard for a motion to dismiss.59 Although there are variations in 
these standards among the circuit courts, in any case the burden to establish 
the existence of federal jurisdiction rests on the removing defendant.60  
3. Extrinsic Evidence 
When resolving a fraudulent joinder question, a court is allowed to look 
beyond the pleadings and engage in a more searching inquiry of the 
evidence than would normally be allowed at such a preliminary stage of the 
litigation.61 All circuit courts allow district courts to look at extrinsic 
evidence to decide the fraudulent joinder issue.62 However, courts disagree 
on the extent to which this evidence can be used.63 Although the law allows 
district courts to consider extrinsic evidence, some will nonetheless confine 
their review to the plaintiff ’s complaint at the time of removal.64 Other 
courts will review the plaintiff ’s complaint first, and then look to relevant 
affidavits to determine if there exist sufficient facts suggesting a possibility 
of recovery against the alleged fraudulently joined defendant.65 Perhaps 
most radically, the Fifth Circuit has permitted review of factual allegations 
in the complaint, affidavits, and deposition transcripts as part of its fraudulent 
joinder determination.66 Under this standard, courts are “nearly compelled” 
to pierce the pleadings in fraudulent joinder cases.67  
 
58 See id. (noting that the standards for fraudulent joinder and for a motion to dismiss are 
similar “in that the crucial question is whether the plaintiff has set out a valid claim under 
applicable state law”). 
59 See Hartley, 187 F.3d at 424 (“[The fraudulent joinder] standard is even more favorable to 
the plaintiff than the standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss . . . .”). 
60 See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 540 (1939) (recognizing the defendant had to 
show “a separable controversy which was wholly between citizens of different States”).  
61 See Monahan, supra note 7, at 1350 (noting that a federal court is permitted to “pierce the 
pleadings to determine whether a plaintiff has a legitimate claim against the diversity-destroying 
defendant”).  
62 Richardson, supra note 47, at 148. 
63 Id. 
64 See, e.g., Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 934 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(limiting the court’s fraudulent joinder inquiry to the facts alleged in the plaintiff ’s complaint).  
65 See, e.g., Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 461-62 (2d Cir. 1998) (determining 
that the plaintiff ’s complaint did not allege a factual basis for recovery against the nondiverse 
defendant and that the information in the affidavits did not cure this deficiency). 
66 See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549, 551 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981) 
(explaining that while review of these documents is permitted, the district court should not have 
conducted a four-day evidentiary hearing that involved exploration of factual issues affecting the 
liability determination).  
67 Richardson, supra note 47, at 152.  
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The piercing of pleadings allowed in fraudulent joinder cases raises 
some concerns. Taken too far, this practice could result in a pretrial of 
merits issues before the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is established.68 
As a result, courts have noted that this piercing must be, to some degree, 
“limited.”69 Even in the Fifth Circuit, where the scope of the fraudulent 
joinder inquiry resembles the scope on review of a summary judgment 
motion, courts have been careful to note that the standard applied to the 
fraudulent joinder question should be “closer to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.”70 
C. Choice of Law Approaches 
In understanding the intersection of these fraudulent joinder doctrines 
and choice of law, it is first necessary to lay a background in choice of law 
principles. In general, each forum has its own “choice of law rule.” A forum 
almost always applies its own choice of law rule.71 A federal court sitting in 
diversity applies the choice of law rule of the state in which it sits and uses 
that rule to choose the appropriate law to apply to a case.72 For example, a 
forum’s choice of law rule could be to “always apply the law of the forum.”73 
In that case, the forum would simply apply its own law to every case. 
Although there are many choice of law rules, the most important for the 
 
68 See id. at 143-44 & 144 n.151 (warning that piercing the pleadings risks an “unconstitutional 
invasion of the federal district court upon the state court,” but noting that a limited piercing is 
constitutionally permissible (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
69 See, e.g., Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that some 
piercing of the pleadings is appropriate in fraudulent joinder cases, but holding that the district 
court’s “summary judgment type inquiry” resembled a decision on the merits and therefore 
exceeded permissible bounds).  
70 McKee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Richardson, supra 
note 47, at 152 (“[P]anels of the Fifth Circuit that make use of the summary judgment language 
often are careful to distinguish their statement of the law regarding the scope of inquiry from the 
standard applied to the facts and law concerning the plaintiff ’s claims against the nondiverse 
defendant.”).  
71 In certain situations, a court may take notice of another forum’s choice of law rules. See 
generally Erwin N. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1938) (discussing 
circumstances in which a state refers to another state’s choice of law rule).  
72 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).  
73 This choice of law rule, “lex fori,” is very rarely used. See Damon C. Andrews & John M. 
Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313, 349, 384 (2013) 
(noting that only two jurisdictions overtly use lex fori and that it is a “parochial” approach that 
“openly favor[s] local law”). The use of lex fori arguably creates problems with the Full Faith and 
Credit clause because it universally ignores all other state’s laws. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 
(“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State.”); see also Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-23 
(1985) (holding that a Kansas court’s universal application of its own law to all parties in a class 
action was unconstitutional because Kansas lacked sufficient contacts to create an interest in the 
claims unrelated to the state). 
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purposes of this Comment are the “traditional” approach, the “interest 
analysis” approach, and the “most significant relationship” approach.74 
1. Traditional Approach 
The traditional approach to choice of law is memorialized in the First 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws.75 The traditional approach is based on the 
idea that each forum’s laws are “territorially bounded”—that is, each state’s 
law applies only to events that occur within the borders of that state.76 
Although the traditional approach contains many rules for different scenari-
os, perhaps the most relevant here is the rule for torts. In a tort case, a court 
following the traditional approach will apply the law of the “place of wrong,” 
which is the place “where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for 
an alleged tort takes place.”77  
Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll78 provides a useful example 
of this approach in practice. In Carroll, the plaintiff was an employee of the 
railroad company, an Alabama corporation.79 The plaintiff, a citizen of 
Alabama, was employed under a contract made in Alabama and worked on a 
railroad extending from Alabama to Mississippi.80 It was the duty of certain 
employees to check the strength of the links between the cars while the 
train was still in Alabama.81 A particular link, however, left Alabama in a 
defective condition.82 When the train entered Mississippi, the defective link 
broke and injured the plaintiff.83 Under Mississippi law, an employer was 
not liable for damages caused by the negligence of an employee’s “fellow 
servant”; by contrast, Alabama had abrogated this fellow servant rule by 
statute.84 As a result, the plaintiff could only recover from his employer if 
Alabama law applied. However, the court found that, because the injury 
occurred in Mississippi, applying the law of the place of wrong meant that 
Mississippi law must apply.85  
 
74 See Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 583 (1996) 
(noting that three-fourths of states use either the traditional approach of the First Restatement of 
Conflicts or the most significant relationship approach of the Second Restatement).  
75 See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).  
76 KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (2010). 
77 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).  
78 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).  
79 Id. at 803.  
80 Id. at 803-04. 
81 Id. at 804.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 805.  
85 Id. at 809.  
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As can be seen in Carroll, the traditional approach can be criticized 
because it sometimes leads to arbitrary results. Even though almost every 
contact in the case was with Alabama, the court was bound to apply Missis-
sippi law under the theory that Alabama law had no force for wrongs 
occurring outside of its territory. 
2. Interest Analysis Approach 
Interest analysis developed in response to the problems with the tradi-
tional approach exemplified in Carroll. The basic idea behind interest 
analysis is that a court should only apply the law of a state when that state 
actually has an “interest” in the outcome of the dispute. If only one state has 
an interest in the outcome of a case, this is merely a “false conflict” between 
states’ policies, and the law of the interested state should apply.86 However, 
if both states are interested, or neither is interested, interest analysis deems 
the conflict unresolvable, and mandates the application of the forum’s law.87 
Under this approach, a case like Carroll would likely be deemed a “false 
conflict.” Since all of the parties were from Alabama, and the negligence 
occurred in Alabama, Mississippi would have little interest in applying its 
law to the dispute; therefore, Alabama law would apply under an interest 
analysis approach.  
3. Most Significant Relationship Approach 
A final approach to choice of law that is prevalent today is set forth in 
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.88 The Second Restatement 
“advises courts to apply the law of the state with ‘the most significant 
relationship’ to a particular issue.”89 The state with the most significant 
relationship is determined based on a multitude of factors, including the 
needs of the interstate system, the policies of the forum, the policies of 
other interested states, the expectations of the parties, the policies of the 
particular field of law, the predictability of the result, and the ease of 
applying the law.90 These factors are then considered in light of other 
factors depending on the type of case at bar. For example, in a tort case, the 
Second Restatement advises a court to consider factors such as the place of 
 
86 See ROOSEVELT, supra note 76, at 50 (“In [false conflict] cases, only one state is interested, 
and therefore applying its law advances its policies without harm to the policies of any other state.”).  
87 See id. at 49 (recommending application of forum law in unprovided-for and true conflicts 
cases). 
88 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).  
89 ROOSEVELT, supra note 76, at 80.  
90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). 
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injury, the place of conduct, the domicile of the parties, and the center of 
the relationship between the parties.91 
Presumably, applying the Second Restatement approach in Carroll, the 
court would have chosen Alabama law. This result is almost certain because 
nearly every factor—including the policies of the forum, the predictability 
of the result, the relationship between the parties, the place of conduct, and 
the domicile of the parties—points toward Alabama law. As a result, a court 
would be hard pressed to find that Mississippi had the “most significant 
relationship” to the dispute.  
II. CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO CHOICE OF LAW IN 
FRAUDULENT JOINDER LITIGATION 
It is not clear how a court should approach a fraudulent joinder analysis 
when faced with a choice of law issue. The law is not well settled on this 
point, and the few courts that have dealt with this issue have reached 
conflicting conclusions. This conflict arises because resolution of the 
fraudulent joinder question determines whether a federal court has subject 
matter jurisdiction. Some courts may be hesitant to make a choice of law 
determination without first establishing that subject matter jurisdiction 
exists. These conflicts implicate the policies behind diversity jurisdiction 
and the different approaches to choice of law.  
The proper resolution of this issue is essential because the law applied to 
the case may determine whether or not a nondiverse defendant is considered 
fraudulently joined. The fraudulent joinder determination, in turn, deter-
mines whether the case will be heard in state or federal court—which will 
often affect whether the parties will litigate the case or settle. This Part 
reviews the approaches that courts have taken to the problem so far. 
A. Refusing to Engage in Choice of Law 
Some courts have simply refused to make a choice of law determination 
when a case has been removed to federal court on the basis of fraudulent 
joinder, and the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court has not yet 
been established. In Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., after a fire 
destroyed their home, the plaintiffs, citizens of California, filed suit in 
California state court against State Farm, a citizen of Illinois, and various 
“John Doe” State Farm employees, who were alleged to be citizens of 
 
91 Id. § 145.  
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California.92 State Farm removed the case to federal court on the grounds of 
diversity of citizenship.93 State Farm then successfully moved to have the 
case transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania.94 The district court 
applied Pennsylvania law and found the plaintiffs’ claims were time-
barred.95 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that complete diversity was 
lacking and, therefore, the federal district court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction; State Farm argued that the “John Doe” defendants had been 
fraudulently joined and should be ignored for the purposes of diversity.96  
The Third Circuit determined that the plaintiffs’ conduct was “con-
sistent with an intention to actually proceed against at least some Doe 
defendants.”97 The court doubted whether the plaintiffs could maintain an 
action against insurance agents under California insurance law but could not 
say definitively that there was no “colorable” basis for the claims.98 State 
Farm argued that, under Pennsylvania law, there was no cause of action 
available against insurance agents, and therefore there could be no colorable 
basis for the plaintiffs’ claims against the Doe insurance agents.99 The court 
declined to decide whether California or Pennsylvania law applied, explaining 
that “[a] federal court cannot engage in a choice of law analysis where 
diversity jurisdiction is not first established.”100 The court remanded the 
case, noting that the insurance agents could be dismissed later if State Farm 
proved that application of Pennsylvania law was correct in state court.101 
The court in Abels prohibited a choice of law determination in the 
fraudulent joinder context, indicating that it was incapable of making a 
choice of law determination without first establishing its subject matter 
jurisdiction.102 Since a fraudulent joinder inquiry may end with a disposi-
tion that diversity does not exist and the federal court does not have subject 
matter jurisdiction, the court concluded that engaging in a choice of law 
analysis was inappropriate.103  
 
92 770 F.2d 26, 27-29 (3d Cir. 1985). 
93 Id. at 28.  
94 Id.  
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 28-29.  
97 Id. at 32.  
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 33 n.10. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 33.  
102 Id. at 33 n.10. 
103 See id.  
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B. Reasonable Possibility Test 
Some courts will not engage in a full choice of law analysis, but rather 
will simply ask whether the plaintiff ’s suggested choice of law is “colorable”; 
if so, the court will remand. In Morris v. Nuzzo, Sampson, an Indiana 
citizen, killed his passenger Morris, also an Indiana citizen, while operating 
a vehicle in Indiana.104 Morris’s estate negotiated with Nuzzo, a claims 
adjuster for Sampson’s insurance company and a citizen of Ohio, but failed 
to settle the claim.105 Consequently, Morris’s estate brought a wrongful 
death suit against Sampson and received a $1.2 million verdict.106 Sampson 
assigned his rights against his insurer to Morris’s estate.107 The estate 
subsequently filed suit against the insurance company and Nuzzo in Ohio 
state court, alleging breach of contract and bad faith failure to pay an 
insurance claim.108 The insurance company and Nuzzo successfully removed 
the case to federal court; the estate moved to remand on the grounds that 
Nuzzo was a citizen of Ohio and could not remove under the “forum 
defendant rule.”109 The insurance company and Nuzzo argued that Nuzzo 
had been fraudulently joined in order to defeat federal jurisdiction.110 The 
district court performed a choice of law analysis and determined that 
Indiana law should be applied because Indiana had the “most significant 
relationship” to the case.111 And because Indiana law would prohibit recovery 
against Nuzzo, even though the claim would have been cognizable under 
Ohio law, the district court denied the estate’s motion to remand.112 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that “the fraudulent joinder analysis 
allows district courts to ‘assume’ limited jurisdiction over an otherwise 
nonremovable action to consider the viability of claims against an alleged 
fraudulently joined defendant.”113 The court explained that, to make the 
fraudulent joinder determination, “the district court must necessarily 
predict what substantive law the state court would apply. . . . [T]herefore, 
 
104 718 F.3d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 2013). 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
109 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012) (“A civil action otherwise removable solely on 
the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the 
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such 
action is brought.”).  
110 Morris, 718 F.3d at 663-64.  
111 Id. at 664. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 671.  
  
622 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 603 
 
the district court must engage in some type of choice of law decision.”114 
The court held that “choice of law decisions can be made as part of the 
fraudulent joinder analysis where the choice of law decision is dispositive to 
the outcome, and where the removing defendant bears the same ‘heavy 
burden’ to make the choice of law showing” as it bears to make the fraudu-
lent joinder showing.115 The court further elaborated: 
A choice of law decision is dispositive to the fraudulent joinder analysis 
when the plaintiff and the removing defendant disagree over the 
substantive law that should govern the claim against the alleged 
fraudulently joined defendant, and where the district court deter-
mines that the claim stands a reasonable possibility of success under 
the plaintiff ’s suggested choice of law but not under the removing 
defendant’s. In that case, the removing defendant can demonstrate 
fraudulent joinder only by showing that, after resolving all issues of 
fact and law in favor of the plaintiff, there is no reasonable possibility 
that the state court would apply the plaintiff ’s suggested choice of 
law.116  
The court of appeals held that the district court erred in deciding the choice 
of law question directly, rather than applying the “reasonable possibility” 
standard of the fraudulent joinder analysis to the choice of law determina-
tion.117 The court held that, in this context, it should be very difficult for the 
defendant to prove his choice of law: if “the plaintiff could satisfy even one 
applicable choice of law factor [in the most significant relationship analysis], 
[the federal court] should end the analysis there and remand the case.”118 
The court decided that because there was at least a reasonable possibility 
that a state court would have applied Ohio law, Nuzzo was not fraudulently 
joined and the case should have been remanded.119 
 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 672. 
116 Id. The Morris court considered this reasonable possibility approach to be consistent with 
the approach of the Third Circuit in Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 
1985). Morris, 718 F.3d at 672 n.7; see also supra Section II.A. Although the Abels court refused to 
engage in a choice of law, the Morris court interpreted the Abels opinion as having first found a 
reasonable possibility that the plaintiff ’s suggested choice of law would apply. Id. However, it is 
difficult to read the Abels and Morris opinions as articulating identical approaches. The Abels court 
merely stated in a footnote that there was a colorable basis for plaintiff ’s suggested choice of law 
and indicated that, were there no such basis, the result “might be different.” 770 F.2d at 33 n.10. 
Unlike the Morris court, the Abels court did not indicate if or how it would actually undertake the 
choice of law analysis.  
117 Morris, 718 F.3d at 672.  
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 674.  
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C. Resolving Ambiguity in Favor of Plaintiff ’s Choice of Law 
Rather than engage in a choice of law analysis, some courts have simply 
declared that a disputed choice of law issue is ambiguous and should 
therefore be resolved in favor of the plaintiff ’s choice of law. In Bellorin v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., the plaintiffs, Mexican and Venezuelan citizens, 
brought suit under Texas law in Texas state court against Firestone, Bridge-
stone, Ford Motor Company, Smithers Transportation Test Centers, and 
Del Rio Test Centers.120 The defendants removed to federal court, where 
the plaintiffs argued that since they were citizens of Mexico and Venezuela 
and Bridgestone was a Japanese corporation, foreign parties were on both 
sides of the controversy and no diversity existed.121 Additionally, plaintiffs 
argued that because Smithers and Del Rio were Texas citizens, the defendants 
were prohibited from removing by the forum-defendant rule.122 The 
defendants countered that Bridgestone, Smithers, and Del Rio were 
fraudulently joined.123 They argued that Mexican or Venezuelan law applied 
to the dispute and neither of those laws provided a cause of action against 
Bridgestone, Firestone, Del Rio, or Smithers.124 
The court determined that, while the defendants may eventually prove 
that Mexican or Venezuelan law should apply, the choice of law question was 
too uncertain at that stage of the litigation.125 Rather than engaging in a 
choice of law analysis, the court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the 
plaintiffs’ choice of law and remanded the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.126  
D. Applying Forum Law 
Some courts have similarly avoided a full choice of law analysis by 
applying the forum’s law to the fraudulent joinder determination and 
reasoning that they do not yet have jurisdiction to conduct a choice of law 
inquiry. In Balberdi v. Lewis, the plaintiff filed suit in Hawaii state court 
against FedEx and two nondiverse individual defendants.127 FedEx removed 
to federal court on the basis that the nondiverse individual defendants were 
 
120 236 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675 (W.D. Tex. 2001). 
121 Id. at 676. 
122 Id. at 677. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 685. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 No. 12-00582, 2013 WL 1296286, at *1 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2013), adopted by 2013 WL 1291780 
(D. Haw. Mar. 27, 2013).  
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fraudulently joined.128 The district court determined that whether the 
plaintiff had stated a claim against the individual defendants depended on 
whether Pennsylvania or Hawaii law applied to the allegations.129 However, 
the court stated that it could not engage in a choice of law analysis where 
diversity jurisdiction had not yet been established.130 Therefore, since the 
action was commenced in Hawaii, the court applied the forum’s own law to 
determine the fraudulent joinder question.131 Applying Hawaii law, the 
court found no fraudulent joinder and remanded the case.132 
E. Conducting a Choice of Law Inquiry Prior to the 
Fraudulent Joinder Analysis 
Many courts decide the choice of law issue before even reaching the 
fraudulent joinder question.133 In Asperger v. Shop Vac Corp., the plaintiff 
brought suit against Shop Vac, a product manufacturer, and Sears, a retailer, 
in Illinois state court after he was injured using a Shop Vac.134 Because the 
plaintiff and Sears were both citizens of Illinois, the presence of Sears in the 
lawsuit defeated diversity.135 Shop Vac removed on the basis that Sears had 
been fraudulently joined.136 It was initially unclear whether Illinois or 
Delaware law applied to the dispute, so the court applied the “most significant 
relationship” choice of law rule and determined that Illinois law governed 
the dispute.137 The court then applied Illinois law and determined that the 
plaintiff had a reasonable basis for recovery against Sears; therefore, Sears 
had not been fraudulently joined, and the case was remanded.138 
The variety of approaches courts take to choice of law in fraudulent 
joinder litigation leads to inconsistent results. This uncertainty suggests that 
a uniform approach to these cases would be valuable.  
 
128 Id. at *1-2. 
129 Id. at *3.  
130 Id.  
131 Id. 
132 Id. at *3, *5. 
133 See, e.g., Collins v. Flynn, No. 08-59, 2008 WL 3851842, at *3-5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2008) 
(determining Massachusetts law applied before finding that the defendant was fraudulently joined 
under Massachusetts standards); Boydstun Metal Works, Inc. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., No. 99-
480, 1999 WL 476265, at *5-6 (D. Or. May 19, 1999) (deciding that Oregon law applied to the 
dispute, then using Oregon case law to resolve the fraudulent joinder question). 
134 524 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (S.D. Ill. 2007). 
135 Id. at 1092. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 1093.  
138 Id. at 1096-97.  
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III. APPLYING FRAUDULENT JOINDER RULES TO THE 
CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS 
Many of these approaches to choice of law in the fraudulent joinder 
context are flawed. When a court is faced with a choice of law problem in 
fraudulent joinder litigation, it must perform a choice of law inquiry—the 
issue cannot be avoided for the sake of convenience. The court should 
perform the choice of law analysis using the same standard as the relevant 
jurisdiction’s fraudulent joinder rule. For example, a jurisdiction may 
require a removing defendant to show that there is “absolutely no possibil-
ity” that the plaintiff can recover against the nondiverse defendant. In that 
case, the defendant must also show that there is “absolutely no possibility” 
that the plaintiff ’s choice of law will apply to the case. This approach is 
faithful to the “heavy burden” placed on the removing defendant and the 
general presumption against removal.139 
A. Refusing to Make a Choice of Law Determination 
Courts cannot simply refuse to engage in a choice of law analysis in 
fraudulent joinder cases. A court cannot properly assess whether a party has 
been fraudulently joined without deciding which law should apply to that 
determination. The plaintiff ’s ability to state a claim against the nondiverse 
defendant is entirely dependent “on the existence of supporting law.”140 If 
there is no law that arguably applies to the plaintiff ’s claim against the 
nondiverse defendant, then the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against 
that defendant and the case should remain in federal court.141  
B. Assuming Forum Law 
Similarly, courts that simply assume forum law applies to the fraudulent 
joinder determination are fundamentally mischaracterizing choice of law. 
This approach rests on the mistaken assumption that choice of law is merely 
a matter of procedure to which the court is free to apply its own law. In 
reality, choice of law is undoubtedly substantive: choice of law rules are 
 
139 See Balberdi v. Lewis, No. 12-00582, 2013 WL 1296286, at *2 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2013) (noting 
the strong presumption against removal and against a finding of fraudulent joinder), adopted by 
2013 WL 1291780 (D. Haw. Mar. 27, 2013).  
140 Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1301, 1305 (1989).  
141 See id. at 1306-07 (arguing that if a plaintiff has failed to show that some law applies to the 
dispute, the plaintiff has failed to establish a right to relief ) .  
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what we use to “define substantive rights” of the parties.142 As Professor 
Kramer explains: “[C]hoice of law is not a matter of procedure. It is, in fact, 
as substantive as it gets.”143 A court making a choice of law determination “is 
deciding what the parties’ rights are in the litigation.”144 Choice of law is 
what we use to “defin[e] the elements of a claim or defense.”145 Therefore, a 
court that simply applies forum law to the fraudulent joinder inquiry bases 
its fraudulent joinder determination on the elements of a claim as defined 
by a law that may not even apply to the dispute. The importance of treating 
choice of law as substantive is especially pronounced in the fraudulent 
joinder context, because fraudulent joinder itself “involves a more substan-
tive look at the claims the diversity-destroying party presents.”146 
C. Assuming the Plaintiff ’s Choice of Law 
While it is true that fraudulent joinder places a “heavy burden” on the 
removing defendant,147 a court should not simply assume the plaintiff ’s 
choice of law. The defendant must also have the chance, under the same 
heavy burden, to prove its choice of law. A simple acceptance of the plaintiff ’s 
choice of law would have the effect of allowing a plaintiff to defeat the 
defendant’s right to removal at will. A plaintiff could select any law, regard-
less of its relationship to the dispute, and plead that law if it allowed the 
plaintiff to state a cause of action against the diversity-destroying defendant. 
This approach allows the plaintiff to manipulate the choice of law determi-
nation. Because forum selection is increasingly important to both parties,148 
the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to prove its choice of law 
and fraudulent joinder.  
D. Making a Choice of Law Prior to the 
Fraudulent Joinder Determination 
A court that engages in a choice of law analysis, selects a law, and then 
conducts the fraudulent joinder inquiry takes the important step of making 
a choice of law determination. However, this strategy is also improper 
 
142 Kramer, supra note 74, at 549.  
143 Id. at 569.  
144 Id. at 570.  
145 Id. 
146 Monahan, supra note 7, at 1349.  
147 See Collins v. Flynn, No. 08-59, 2008 WL 3851842, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2008) (“The 
defendant bears the heavy burden of proving [fraudulent joinder] by clear and convincing 
evidence, with all factual and legal ambiguities resolved in favor of plaintiff.”). 
148 See supra Section I.A. 
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because it mistakenly treats choice of law as if it is “something distinct from, 
and antecedent to, the process of ‘applying’ a law to decide the merits.”149 If 
there is no colorable law to apply to the plaintiff ’s claim against the 
nondiverse defendant, there can be, by definition, no merit in the claim 
against that defendant. The choice of law question, therefore, cannot be 
decided independently of the merits of the case, yet the approach taken by 
these courts depends on the idea that the merits and choice of law questions 
are distinct.  
Further, in fraudulent joinder litigation, a court cannot approach a 
choice of law analysis in the same way that it would if subject matter 
jurisdiction had already been established—the court does not yet have this 
right.150 Performing an independent choice of law inquiry prior to reaching 
the fraudulent joinder question allows the defendant to have a full hearing 
on the choice of law issue, which is inappropriate at that stage of the 
litigation. This approach is subject to manipulation because the removing 
defendant can have his choice of law established in the case merely by 
raising a fraudulent joinder claim.  
This method also fails to give proper deference to the plaintiff ’s choice 
of forum. A plaintiff should have meaningful control over choice of forum. 
The “heavy burden” placed on the removing defendant to show fraudulent 
joinder is based on a respect for the plaintiff ’s choice of forum and on the 
concept that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint. Engaging in a 
choice of law analysis prior to the fraudulent joinder inquiry, without 
ensuring that the party has met the “heavy burden” placed on a showing of 
fraudulent joinder, fails to recognize these principles. Rather than placing 
the appropriate burden on the removing defendant, this approach wrongfully 
empowers the defendant to challenge the plaintiff ’s choice of law.  
E. Applying Fraudulent Joinder Burdens to the 
Choice of Law Determination 
The same standards that apply to the fraudulent joinder question should 
apply to the choice of law question. The choice of law inquiry must be 
consistent with the fraudulent joinder burden. Therefore, “choice of law 
decisions can be made as part of the fraudulent joinder analysis . . . where 
the removing defendant bears the same ‘heavy burden’ to make the choice of 
 
149 Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 245, 257 (1991). 
150 See Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that the district court was 
correct in making a choice of law determination but erred in treating that choice of law question as 
if it were deciding it directly). 
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law showing” as to make the fraudulent joinder showing.151 Thus, a court 
should look to the applicable fraudulent joinder standard in the jurisdiction 
(e.g., “no reasonable possibility,” “absolutely no possibility”) and apply that 
same standard to the plaintiff ’s choice of law. In other words, to prove 
fraudulent joinder, the diverse defendant must show that there is, for 
example, “absolutely no possibility” that the plaintiff ’s choice of law applies. 
Applying the relevant fraudulent joinder burden to the choice of law 
inquiry gives the defendant the opportunity to make a showing of his choice 
of law to support his fraudulent joinder allegation without giving him the 
opportunity to have a premature full hearing on the issue.  
This approach is faithful to the idea that choice of law is a question con-
cerning the merits of the case, rather than “a distinct threshold question that 
must be resolved before the court can render a decision on the merits.”152 A 
decision can be rendered on the merits of the claim against the alleged 
fraudulently joined defendant only with reference to a particular state’s law. 
Answering the choice of law question often requires resolving disputed 
issues of fact and identifying the interests involved in a particular case—
determinations which are inherently intertwined with the merits. Applying 
the unique burdens of the fraudulent joinder structure to the choice of law 
determination upholds this understanding of choice of law as a merits 
question and gives proper deference to the plaintiff ’s choice of forum.  
CONCLUSION 
A choice of law determination must be made in the context of fraudulent 
joinder litigation. However, that determination is not a freestanding inquiry 
but rather an inquiry that must be made with reference to a jurisdiction’s 
particular fraudulent joinder standard. Federal courts should apply the same 
burden to the choice of law determination that they apply to the fraudulent 
joinder showing. A court that applies a “no reasonable possibility” standard 
to a finding of fraudulent joinder, for example, should apply that same “no 
reasonable possibility” standard to the choice of law determination. Unlike 
many existing approaches, this approach recognizes that, in a fraudulent 
joinder case, the federal court has not yet established its subject matter 
jurisdiction. Therefore, the choice of law inquiry must be modified as 
determined by the jurisdiction’s fraudulent joinder rules.  
Just as a choice of law analysis undoubtedly involves the merits of a given 
case, so too does the fraudulent joinder inquiry. “A decision about fraudulent 
 
151 Id.  
152 Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 306 (1990). 
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joinder is a decision about merits; it is a decision about the merits of the 
case against the non-diverse defendants.”153 Fraudulent joinder litigation 
offers federal courts a unique opportunity to delve into the merits of a case, 
including the case’s choice of law issues, even prior to establishing subject 
matter jurisdiction.  
Understanding the appropriate method for choice of law analysis in the 
fraudulent joinder context ensures that cases are litigated in the proper 
forums. Fraudulent joinder is ultimately a dispute between two sides 
arguing to have their case heard in the most favorable forum. Since forum 
selection is one of the most important and determinative aspects of a given 
case, and proper resolution of the choice of law issue can be dispositive to 
the forum determination, a uniform approach is necessary. The suggested 
approach for choice of law in fraudulent joinder cases offers an equitable 
solution to the problem without unfairly constraining plaintiffs’ choice of 
forum or defendants’ statutory right to removal.  
 
153 In re New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 288, 304 (D. 
Mass. 2004). 
